We consider a two-stage supply chain consisted of one supplier and two retailers in a two-period selling, where retailers compete for limited capacity, and the supplier adopts both a minimum order quantity contract and allocation mechanisms during dealing with retailers. In this study, we solve the equilibrium order quantities of retailers in the presence of the minimum order quantity under fixed and turn-and-earn allocations by game theory. Further, we compare two allocations on inducing the downstream order, and explore the impact of the minimum order quantity on retailers’ ordering decisions as well as the supply chain profit. We find that turn-and-earn allocation induces more order quantity in low demand state than fixed allocation. Moreover, compared to the case without the minimum order quantity, when the minimum order quantity is on a certain interval, it can help shrink the gap of equilibrium order quantities between turn-and-earn allocation and fixed allocation in the first period. Besides, under the two allocation mechanisms, the profits of the supplier and the supply chain are both non-decreasing while each retailer’s profit is non-increasing with the minimum order quantity. Last, in the extension of allocation mechanisms by involving inventory, both the first period order quantity and selling quantity under turn-and-earn allocation are still more than that under fixed allocation, when capacity is large.

我们考虑一个由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的两阶段供应链，在两阶段销售中，零售商竞争有限的产能，供应商在与零售商打交道时采用最小订货量合同和分配机制。在这项研究中，我们通过博弈论解决了在固定和周转收入分配下存在最小订购量的零售商的均衡订购量。此外，我们比较了两种分配对下游订单的诱导，并探讨了最小订单量对零售商的订购决策以及供应链利润的影响。我们发现，在低需求状态下，周转收入分配比固定分配产生更多的订单数量。而且，与没有起订量的情况相比，当最小订货量在一定区间时，有助于缩小第一期周转分配与固定分配的均衡订货量差距。此外，在两种分配机制下，供应商和供应链的利润都是不减少的，而每个零售商的利润都是不增加的，最小订货量。最后，在涉及库存的分配机制的扩展中，当产能大时，周转分配下的第一期订单数量和销售数量仍然大于固定分配下的。供应商和供应链的利润都是不减少的，而每个零售商的利润都是不增加的，最小订货量。最后，在涉及库存的分配机制的扩展中，当产能大时，周转分配下的第一期订单数量和销售数量仍然大于固定分配下的。供应商和供应链的利润都是不减少的，而每个零售商的利润都是不增加的，最小订货量。最后，在涉及库存的分配机制的扩展中，当产能大时，周转分配下的第一期订单数量和销售数量仍然大于固定分配下的。