Intermediaries play a significant role in capital markets by reducing disclosure processing costs to market participants. Yet, due to selection and other empirical challenges, the extent and mechanisms through which intermediaries influence firm disclosure are largely unknown. To address these challenges, I conduct a field experiment that randomizes coverage of a mandatory disclosure by two key intermediaries—non-governmental organizations and the media. I show that this coverage causes noncompliant firms to publish the disclosure and firms with low-quality disclosures to improve their existing disclosures. Surprisingly, new disclosures from previously noncompliant firms are on average low quality. Survey evidence and cross-sectional tests suggest the main effect may be driven by firms perceiving pressure from the regulator, whose processing costs may have been reduced. My results yield causal estimates of the effect of intermediary coverage on disclosure and shed light on the nature of the stakeholders that subsequently exert costs on firms.

中介机构通过降低市场参与者的披露处理成本在资本市场中发挥重要作用。然而，由于选择和其他实证挑战，中介机构影响公司披露的程度和机制在很大程度上是未知的。为了应对这些挑战，我进行了一项实地实验，将两个关键中介机构（非政府组织和媒体）对强制披露的报道随机化。我表明，这种覆盖会导致不合规的公司发布披露信息，而披露质量较低的公司会改进其现有的披露信息。令人惊讶的是，以前不合规的公司新披露的信息平均质量较低。调查证据和横断面测试表明，主要影响可能是由公司感受到来自监管机构的压力所驱动的，其处理成本可能已经降低。我的结果得出了中介覆盖对披露影响的因果估计，并阐明了随后对公司造成成本的利益相关者的性质。