Existing studies on pilot contamination attack often assume that the attack and jamming strategies of adversaries are fixed. The enemy has not made any strategic corrections to the detection plan. In this paper, we analyze how an intelligent malicious user considers the role of legitimate user and adjusts attacking strategy during training phase in wireless communication to improve his eavesdropping performance. By defender-attacker interaction as a Stackelberg game, Bob as the leader chooses his pilot training power, while a full-duplex eavesdropper as the follower determines the pilot contamination power according to the observed Bob’s ongoing training signals transmission. Two equilibriums under different strategy spaces are analyzed. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can defend against an intelligent active eavesdropper with a higher secrecy rate and utility.

现有关于飞行员污染攻击的研究通常假设对手的攻击和干扰策略是固定的。敌人没有对探测计划进行任何战略修正。在本文中，我们分析了智能恶意用户如何在无线通信的训练阶段考虑合法用户的角色并调整攻击策略以提高其窃听性能。通过防御者与攻击者的交互作为一个 Stackelberg 博弈，作为领导者的 Bob 选择他的飞行员训练功率，而作为跟随者的全双工窃听者根据观察到的 Bob 正在进行的训练信号传输来确定飞行员的污染功率。分析了不同策略空间下的两种均衡。