ABSTRACT

In Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord Atkin in the majority perceived the Christian principle of loving one’s neighbour to require a duty of reasonable care to the neighbour, who was [a person who is] ‘so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question’. In Liversidge v Anderson his Lordship held in dissent that ‘In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which, on recent authority, we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of persons, and stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in law’. Lord Atkin was a practising Christian, and both statements appear to have biblical roots. As no-one seems to have done before, this paper brings an exegetical focus to those roots to see whether or not they provide support for Lord Atkin’s approach in each case.

摘要

在多诺霍诉史蒂文森案中，阿特金勋爵以多数人的观点认为，爱邻人的基督教原则要求对邻人负有合理照顾的义务，而邻当我将思想引导到被质疑的作为或不作为时，让它们处于沉思之中”。在利弗西奇诉安德森案中，他的大法官持不同意见，“在英国，在武器冲突中，法律并没有沉默。他们可能会改变，但他们在战争中和在和平中说同样的语言。它一直是自由的支柱之一，自由原则之一，根据最近的权威，我们现在正在为之奋斗，法官不尊重人，并站在主体与行政部门对其自由的任何企图侵犯之间，警惕任何强制行动在法律上是正当的”。阿特金勋爵是一位虔诚的基督徒，这两种说法似乎都有圣经根源。正如以前似乎没有人做过的那样，本文将解经重点放在这些根源上，看看它们是否在每种情况下都支持阿特金勋爵的方法。