There is a longstanding argument that purports to show that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with human freedom to do otherwise. Proponents of this argument, however, have for some time been met with the following reply: the argument posits what would have to be a mysterious non-causal constraint on freedom. In this paper, I argue that this objection is misguided—not because after all there can indeed be non-causal constraints on freedom (as in Pike, Fischer, and Hunt), but because the success of the incompatibilist's argument does not require the real possibility of non-causal constraints on freedom. I contend that the incompatibilist's argument is best seen as showing that, given divine foreknowledge, something makes one unfree—and that this something is most plausibly identified, not with the foreknowledge itself, but with the causally deterministic factors that would have to be in place in order for there to be infallible foreknowledge in the first place.

中文翻译：

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预知需要决定论

有一个长期存在的论点，旨在表明神圣的预知与人类不这样做的自由是不一致的。然而，这一论点的支持者一段时间以来得到了以下答复：该论点提出了对自由的神秘非因果约束。在本文中，我认为这种反对意见是错误的——不是因为毕竟确实可能存在对自由的非因果约束（如派克、费舍尔和亨特），而是因为不相容论者的论点的成功并不需要真正的自由。对自由进行非因果限制的可能性。我认为，不相容论者的论点最好被视为表明，鉴于神圣的预知，某些东西使人不自由——而这种东西最有可能的认同，不是与预知本身，而是与因果决定论因素，这些因素必须就位，以便首先存在无误的预知。