The fact that our attitudes change poses well-known challenges for attitude-sensitive wellbeing theories. Suppose that in the past you favoured your adventurous youthful life more than the quiet and unassuming life you expected to live as an old person; now when you look back you favour your current life more than your youthful past life. Which period of your life is better for you? More generally, how can we find a stable attitude-sensitive standard of wellbeing, if the standard is in part defined in terms of unstable attitudes? In this paper, I introduce an ‘attitudinal matrix’ framework that will help us clear up the problems posed by changing attitudes across time. In particular, it will help us see what is at stake, which principles that can or cannot be combined, and what might be the best solution. I defend a very plausible candidate constraint on a solution to the challenge of changing attitudes, which I call ‘diagonalism’. It is argued that among the three main forms of substantive attitude-sensitive wellbeing theories – the attitude-version, the object-version, and the satisfaction-version – it is the satisfaction-version that can both satisfy diagonalism and provide the best account of temporal and lifetime wellbeing.

我们的态度改变这一事实对态度敏感的幸福理论提出了众所周知的挑战。假设过去你更喜欢冒险的年轻生活，而不是你期望像老人一样过的安静和谦逊的生活；现在，当你回首往事时，比起年轻的前世，你更喜欢现在的生活。你人生的哪个时期更适合你？更一般地说，如果标准部分是根据不稳定的态度来定义的，我们如何才能找到一个稳定的态度敏感的幸福标准？在本文中，我介绍了一个“态度矩阵”框架，该框架将帮助我们清除随时间变化的态度所带来的问题。特别是，它将帮助我们了解什么是利害攸关的，哪些原则可以或不能结合，以及什么可能是最好的解决方案。我为一个非常合理的候选人约束辩护，以解决改变态度的挑战，我称之为“对角线主义”。有人认为，在态度敏感性幸福理论的三种主要形式——态度版本、对象版本和满足版本——中，满足对角主义的满足版本既能满足对角线的要求，又能提供最好的解释。时间和一生的幸福。