This paper develops a question-sensitive theory of intention. We show that this theory explains some puzzling closure properties of intention. In particular, it can be used to explain why one is rationally required to intend the means to one’s ends, even though one is not rationally required to intend all the foreseen consequences of one’s intended actions. It also explains why rational intention is not always closed under logical implication, and why one can only intend outcomes that one believes to be under one’s control.

中文翻译：

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一个问题敏感的意图理论

本文发展了一种对问题敏感的意图理论。我们表明，该理论解释了意图的一些令人费解的闭合特性。特别是，它可以用来解释为什么一个人被合理地要求打算达到自己的目的的手段，即使一个人没有被合理地要求去打算一个人的预期行动的所有可预见的后果。它还解释了为什么理性意图并不总是在逻辑暗示下封闭，以及为什么一个人只能意图一个人认为在自己控制之下的结果。