ABSTRACT

The article analyses the gaps and ties betweenthe doctrine and theory, in contrast with the practice, of countering subversive movements in the British Empire during the Interbellum. Contradictions between security services led to the articulation and promotion of different models of counterinsurgency. The research contains an analysis of the guerrilla warfare concept’ evolution within the military thought, through the second Boer war, Irish warof Independence and the second Arab rising in Palestine, reflecting different thoughts on interrelated problems of the ‘revolutionary movements’ and ‘sub-war’ after the Great War. Particular attentionis paid to military and political incentives and constrains of the counterinsurgency doctrine, reflecting the bureaucratic logic that stood behind the implementation of the guerrilla warfare concept at the levels of doctrine and theory in the context of the systemic crisis of empire and the growth of external pressure over the questions of the imperial defense and self-determination. Conflicting coexistence of internal security models tested within the British Empire during the Interbellum is observed in the conclusion,as well as perspectives of transfers of colonial (dis)order in front of the ‘sub-war’, as it was understood among the military circles through the prism of the guerrilla warfare concept.

摘要

这篇文章分析了在间战期间打击大英帝国颠覆运动的理论与理论之间的差距和联系，并与实践进行了对比。安全部门之间的矛盾导致了不同反叛乱模式的表达和推广。该研究分析了游击战概念在军事思想中的演变，经历了第二次布尔战争、爱尔兰独立战争和巴勒斯坦的第二次阿拉伯起义，反映了对“革命运动”和“次级运动”相互关联问题的不同思考。大战之后的战争。特别注意平叛学说的军事和政治激励和约束，反映了在帝国系统性危机和帝国防御和自决问题上的外部压力增加的背景下，在学说和理论层面实施游击战概念背后的官僚逻辑。在结论中观察到在间战期间在大英帝国内部测试的内部安全模型的冲突共存，以及在“次战争”前殖民（混乱）秩序转移的观点，正如军事界所理解的那样通过游击战概念的棱镜。