There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are “ontologically flexible” kinds. That is, their real definitions allow for both physical objects and mental entities to be colored or shaped. Second, a single instance of these qualities can be attributed to more than one entity. Just as we attribute the same instance of a material property to a statue and to the clay that constitutes it, single instances of sensible qualities should be attributed both to the physical objects perceived and to the perceptual states that have those instances as their objects.

中文翻译：

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明智的个性化

有一种直截了当的感知观点尚未得到充分考虑，因为它要求我们重新思考关于感知对象的基本假设。在本文中，我对这些物体（即感性品质）进行了新颖的描述，为直接的观点腾出了空间。我捍卫两个主要主张。首先，我认为颜色和形状等品质是“本体论上灵活的”类型。也就是说，它们的真正定义允许物理对象和精神实体都被着色或成形。二、单实例这些品质的其中之一可以归因于多个实体。正如我们将同一物质属性实例归因于雕像和构成雕像的粘土一样，可感知品质的单个实例也应归因于感知的物理对象和以这些实例为对象的感知状态。