ABSTRACT

In response to the crisis in the Sahel, myriad programmes have been set up with the aim of improving the performance of the defence and security forces in the region. These programmes are often run or supported by international partners. Yet, as the security situation in the region worsens, questions have been raised about whether these programmes are relevant and effective. In this article, we will argue that most of the programmes designed to build the capacities of, restructure or reform the armed forces in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have failed to grasp that these security systems function on a fundamentally hybrid basis, with a combination of – and often a clash between – legal and rational approaches, on the one hand, and informal dynamics, on the other, and that this can often hinder implementation of reforms.

摘要

为应对萨赫勒地区的危机，已经制定了无数计划，旨在提高该地区国防和安全部队的绩效。这些项目通常由国际合作伙伴运行或支持。然而，随着该地区安全局势的恶化，人们对这些计划是否相关和有效提出了质疑。在本文中，我们将论证，大多数旨在建设布基纳法索、马里和尼日尔武装部队的能力、重组或改革武装部队的计划都未能掌握这些安全系统在基本混合的基础上发挥作用，结合一方面是合法的和理性的方法，另一方面是非正式的动态，而且往往是冲突，而且这往往会阻碍改革的实施。