Some epistemologists think that the Bayesian ideals matter because we can approximate them. That is, our attitudes can be more or less close to the ones of our ideal Bayesian counterpart. In this paper, I raise a worry for this justification of epistemic ideals. The worry is this: In order to correctly compare agents to their ideal counterparts, we need to imagine idealized agents who have the same relevant information, knowledge, or evidence. However, there are cases in which one's ideal counterpart cannot have one's information, knowledge, or evidence. In these situations, agents cannot compare themselves to their ideal counterpart.

中文翻译：

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近似认知理想的比较问题

一些认识论者认为贝叶斯理想很重要，因为我们可以接近它们。也就是说，我们的态度可以或多或少地接近我们理想的贝叶斯对手的态度。在本文中，我对这种认知理想的辩护提出了担忧。令人担忧的是：为了正确地将代理人与其理想对手进行比较，我们需要想象具有相同相关信息、知识或证据的理想化代理人。然而，在某些情况下，一个人的理想对手无法拥有自己的信息、知识或证据。在这些情况下，代理无法将自己与理想的对手进行比较。