Dishonesty is ubiquitous and imposes substantial financial and social burdens on society. Intuitively, dishonesty results from a failure of willpower to control selfish behavior. However, recent research suggests that the role of cognitive control in dishonesty is more complex. We review evidence that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se, but that it depends on individual differences in what we call one’s ‘moral default’: for those who are prone to dishonesty, cognitive control indeed aids in being honest, but for those who are already generally honest, cognitive control may help them cheat to occasionally profit from small acts of dishonesty. Thus, the role of cognitive control in (dis)honesty is to override the moral default.

不诚实行为无处不在，给社会带来了巨大的经济和社会负担。直觉上，不诚实是由于意志力无法控制自私行为造成的。然而，最近的研究表明，认知控制在不诚实中的作用更为复杂。我们回顾了认知控制本身不需要诚实或不诚实的证据，但它取决于我们所谓的“道德默认”的个体差异：对于那些容易不诚实的人来说，认知控制确实有助于诚实，但对于那些已经普遍诚实的人来说，认知控制可能会帮助他们作弊，偶尔从小小的不诚实行为中获利。因此，认知控制在（不）诚实中的作用是超越道德默认值。