Abstract

International cooperation between intelligence services poses a dilemma. It is an important tool in countering today’s complex transnational threats, but at the same time, cooperation is a risky business. Intelligence services can never be sure that a partner will reciprocate in kind. Scholars and practitioners often identify trust as one of the foremost conditions to overcome this dilemma. Yet the notion of trust is seldomly conceptualized in these rational-calculative explanations. Contrary to the common view that intelligence services are exceptional in their opportunism and rivalry, social relations and trustworthiness perceptions provide a more dominant explanation for the level of cooperation between intelligence partners than is often assumed by scholars and practitioners. Known reputations, recognized professional standards, and shared traits socially bind intelligence professionals to their community of practice, enabling them to bridge divides like nationality and even conflicting interests. Intelligence services resemble many other organizations in the public and private domains, requiring a de-exceptionalization of their international cooperation.

摘要

情报部门之间的国际合作造成了两难境地。它是应对当今复杂的跨国威胁的重要工具，但与此同时，合作也是一项冒险的事业。情报部门永远无法确定合作伙伴会以实物回报。学者和实践者通常将信任视为克服这一困境的最重要条件之一。然而，在这些理性计算的解释中，信任的概念很少被概念化。与情报部门在机会主义和竞争方面例外的普遍观点相反，社会关系和可信度感知为情报合作伙伴之间的合作水平提供了比学者和从业者通常假设的更主要的解释。知名的声誉，公认的专业标准，和共同特征将情报专业人员与他们的实践社区联系起来，使他们能够弥合国籍甚至利益冲突等分歧。情报服务类似于公共和私人领域的许多其他组织，需要对其国际合作进行去例外化。