Using hand-collected data from the U.S., we examine the influence of political money contributions (PMC) on IPO financial reporting. Unraveling the conflicting managerial incentives, we develop and test three distinct hypotheses whereby accounting discretion is utilized to downplay, embellish, or truthfully impart the PMC firm’s prospects. Consistent with the last two hypotheses, we document income-increasing reporting. The effects are strongest for firms sensitive to policy outcomes, and least affected by contemporaneous political events. Post-issue analysis shows that at-issue discretionary accruals systematically predict future accounting performance but are unrelated to stock returns. Survival analysis indicates a lower probability of IPO failure. Robust to a battery of checks, our results support the value-relevance of financial information and a novel use of accounting discretion as a means of signaling expected political gains.

使用从美国手工收集的数据，我们研究了政治捐款（PMC）对 首次公开募股财务报告。解开相互冲突的管理激励，我们开发并测试了三个不同的假设，其中会计自由裁量权被用来淡化、美化或真实地传达 PMC 公司的前景。与最后两个假设一致，我们记录了收入增加的报告。对于对政策结果敏感的公司，这种影响最为强烈，并且受同时期政治事件的影响最小。发行后分析表明，有争议的全权应计项目系统地预测了未来的会计业绩，但与股票收益无关。生存分析表明 IPO 失败的可能性较低。经过一系列检查，我们的结果支持财务信息的价值相关性以及会计自由裁量权的新用途，以作为预期政治收益的信号手段。