Some have claimed that there are laws of appearance, i.e. in principle constraints on which types of sensory experiences are possible. Within a representationalist framework, these laws amount to restrictions on what a given experience can represent. I offer an in-depth defence of one such law and explain why prevalent externalist varieties of representationalism have trouble accommodating it. In light of this, I propose a variety of representationalism on which the spatial content of experience is determined by intrinsic features of conscious subjects. I conclude by considering an externalist-friendly reworking of my proposal, but suggest that the success of such a reworking is dubious.

中文翻译：

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感官不能“说”什么

有些人声称存在外观法则，即原则上限制了哪些类型的感官体验是可能的。在再现主义的框架内，这些法则相当于对给定体验可以代表什么的限制。我对这样一条规律进行了深入的辩护，并解释了为什么流行的外部主义变体难以适应它。有鉴于此，我提出了各种再现主义，在这些再现主义上，经验的空间内容是由有意识的主体的内在特征决定的。最后，我考虑对我的提案进行外部友好的修改，但建议这种修改的成功是值得怀疑的。