Kraus’s book is both deep and wide-ranging. My comments focus on her account of Kant on self-awareness – both a priori and empirical apperception. Basic to her account is what she calls the hylomorphism of mental faculties in Kant. Kraus distinguishes her ‘reflexive’ account of apperception from both ‘logical’ and ‘psychological’ accounts. An inevitable question is: Does Kant think we have an empirical cognition of the self? Kraus seems to want to say yes, but I question this answer. Cognition requires both intuition and conception. My claim is that it requires intuition in both space and time, but inner empirical self-awareness is apparently in time only. Kant’s Refutation of Idealism in B, as developed later in the Kiesewetter essays, makes awareness of our body essential to time determination.

克劳斯的书既深刻又广泛。我的评论集中在她对康德关于自我意识的描述——先验的和经验的统觉。她的叙述的基本内容是她在康德中所说的心智能力的亚型。克劳斯将她对统觉的“反思性”解释与“逻辑”和“心理”解释区分开来。一个不可避免的问题是：康德认为我们有经验认知吗？的自我？克劳斯似乎想说是的，但我质疑这个答案。认知需要直觉和概念。我的主张是，它需要空间和时间的直觉，但内在经验的自我意识显然只在时间上。康德在 B 中对唯心主义的反驳，正如后来在 Kiesewetter 论文中所发展的那样，使我们的身体意识对于时间决定至关重要。