Governments often use curfews as counterinsurgency measures. Do such state actions affect citizens’ political preferences? We argue that citizens’ responses depend on their group alignment. Citizens who are aligned with the government are more likely to interpret state actions as serving their interests and reward the governing parties as a result. Citizens who are aligned with the insurgent movement, however, are likely to interpret these same actions as targeted and disengage from politics: they have no reason to reward the governing parties and may also be fearful of expressing support for the parties affiliated with the insurgent movement. We find support for this argument with survey data from Turkey, fielded before and during curfews. When exposed to curfews, Turks generally increase their support for the governing party. However Kurds do not increase their support for the governing party or the opposition; instead, we present strong evidence that they withdraw their support from the Kurdish opposition and become more hesitant to express any political preferences.

政府经常使用宵禁作为平叛措施。这种国家行为会影响公民的政治偏好吗？我们认为公民的反应取决于他们的群体一致性。与政府结盟的公民更有可能将国家行为解释为为他们的利益服务，并因此奖励执政党。然而，与叛乱运动结盟的公民可能会将这些相同的行动解释为有针对性的和脱离政治：他们没有理由奖励执政党，也可能害怕表达对与叛乱运动有关联的政党的支持. 我们在宵禁前和宵禁期间提供的土耳其调查数据支持这一论点。当面临宵禁时，土耳其人通常会增加对执政党的支持。然而，库尔德人并没有增加对执政党或反对党的支持；相反，我们提供了强有力的证据，表明他们撤回了对库尔德反对派的支持，并且在表达任何政治偏好时变得更加犹豫不决。