How does domestic surveillance affect the frequency of political imprisonments in autocratic states? In contrast to conventional wisdom, I argue that surveillance reduces the frequency of political imprisonments in power-maximizing autocracies. Surveillance decreases uncertainty about the correct targets of repression, allowing for more selective detentions and shifts to silent instruments of repression. To investigate these claims, I draw on a unique county-level dataset of political imprisonment in the German Democratic Republic between 1984 and 1988. I proxy the number of monitored individuals with newly collected county-level data on surveillance operations. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and instrumental variable models to investigate the impact of surveillance on political imprisonment. I find that higher shares of spies per monitored individual were associated with a reduction of political imprisonment. Further, increasing levels of spy infiltration were linked to a systematic shift to silent instruments of repression.

国内监视如何影响专制国家的政治监禁频率？与传统观点相反，我认为监视减少了权力最大化专制国家中政治监禁的频率。监视减少了对正确镇压目标的不确定性，允许更有选择性的拘留和转向沉默的镇压工具。为了调查这些说法，我利用了 1984 年至 1988 年间德意志民主共和国独特的县级政治监禁数据集。我用新收集的县级监视行动数据来代替受监视个人的数量。我使用普通最小二乘 (OLS) 回归、随机效应和工具变量模型来调查监视对政治监禁的影响。我发现，每个受监视个人的间谍比例较高与政治监禁的减少有关。此外，越来越多的间谍渗透与系统性地转向无声的镇压工具有关。