Abstract

This study aims to investigate how local governments strategically respond to fiscal controls imposed by state governments. Specifically, we explore the effects of state fiscal preemptions on the way local governments deliver public services—that is, contracting out. Using negative binomial regressions, we found that state fiscal preemptions increase the tendency of local governments to contract out public services. However, the dynamics of contracting out depend on the local government’s current municipal fiscal status and the type of service provider. When local governments perceive a high level of fiscal stress, they tend to take a passive stance to contracting out. Moreover, the relationship between fiscal preemptions and contracting out varies contingent on the type of service provider. In sum, the findings suggest that local governments actively respond to institutional limitations on municipal fiscal activities in order to overcome supply and demand challenges, although the choice of service delivery method varies depending on fiscal conditions and the type of service provider.

摘要

本研究旨在调查地方政府如何战略性地应对州政府实施的财政控制。具体而言，我们探讨了国家财政优先权对地方政府提供公共服务（即外包）方式的影响。使用负二项式回归，我们发现国家财政优先权增加了地方政府将公共服务外包的倾向。然而，外包的动态取决于当地政府当前的市政财政状况和服务提供商的类型。当地方政府感知到高水平的财政压力时，他们往往会采取被动的姿态将外包出去。此外，财政优先权和外包之间的关系因服务提供商的类型而异。总共，