Forestland can be managed for timber and environmental goods simultaneously. A conservation contract allows a government agency to pay a landowner for the portion of property rights encumbered in the production of environmental goods. In this study, a theoretical model is developed to examine optimal contract provisions for carbon sequestration on working forests under a budget constraint for the agency. The analyses reveal that a landowner requires a higher payment if more property rights are encumbered in a conservation contract. A landowner whose land can sequester more carbon also requires a more favorable contract arrangement. Assuming a logistic growth path for carbon sequestration, the agency under a budget constraint tends to have a shallower relationship with more landowners, that is, encumbering a smaller portion of property rights from more landowners. This tendency supports the use of conservation contracts with a shorter term and a higher enrollment share in a forest community.

中文翻译：

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保护工作森林的最佳合同安排

林地可以同时管理木材和环境产品。保护合同允许政府机构向土地所有者支付用于生产环境产品的财产权部分。在这项研究中，开发了一个理论模型来检查在该机构的预算约束下对工作森林进行碳封存的最佳合同条款。分析表明，如果保护合同中包含更多的产权，土地所有者需要支付更高的费用。其土地可以吸收更多碳的土地所有者也需要更有利的合同安排。假设碳封存的物流增长路径，预算约束下的机构往往与更多的土地所有者有较浅的关系，即 阻碍更多土地所有者的一小部分财产权。这种趋势支持在森林社区中使用期限更短、入学率更高的保护合同。