According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After that, I use those principles to formulate a diachronic skeptical argument. This argument yields the counterintuitive conclusion that understanding a global skeptical hypothesis is all it takes for a rational subject to lose all her perceptual knowledge of the world. Next, I show that a popular Austinian move must reject one or another of the principles that underlie ED. I close by delineating a novel strategy that can block the diachronic skeptical argument while preserving all the principles. The key idea is that perceptual knowledge is grounded in primitive, perceptual and recognitional abilities. This view sheds new light on some puzzling features of global skepticism that have been noted by Descartes and Hume, among others.

中文翻译：

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A-理性认识论析取主义

根据认识论析取主义 (ED)，在知觉知识的典型案例中，主体S具有知觉知识p ，因为她拥有她相信p的理由，这些理由对于S. 有人认为，ED 比知识内在主义和知识外在主义更能削弱基于不确定性的怀疑论。如果 ED 要以独特的方式实现这一目标，我确定了几个必须正确的原则。之后，我使用这些原则来制定一个历时的怀疑论证。这个论点得出了一个违反直觉的结论，即理解一个全局怀疑假设是理性主体失去她对世界的所有感性知识所需要的全部。接下来，我展示了一个流行的奥斯汀式移动必须拒绝作为 ED 基础的一个或另一个原则。最后，我描述了一种新颖的策略，它可以在保留所有原则的同时阻止历时性的怀疑论证。关键思想是感性知识是基于原始的，感知和识别能力。这种观点为笛卡尔和休谟等人所指出的全球怀疑主义的一些令人费解的特征提供了新的思路。