Has the theory of rationality as ‘openness to criticism’ solved the problem of ‘rational belief in reason’? This is the main question the present article intends to address. I respond to this question by arguing that the justified true belief account of knowledge has prevented Karl Popper’s critical and William Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism from solving the problem of rational belief in reason. To elaborate this response, the article presents its arguments in three stages: First, it argues that the idea of objective knowledge as justified true belief leads to the equation of objective knowledge with justification. Hence, if we base the theory of critical rationalism, as openness to criticism, upon such a conception of knowledge, our theory of rationality involves in infinite regress of proofs. Second, it argues that Popper describes critical rationalism as an ‘irrational attitude’ of openness to criticism because the rationalist cannot justify his belief in reason by argument or experience. Thus, since Popper assumes that ‘a belief in reason’ must be justified in order to be ‘rational’ he cannot lead to a solution for the problem of rational belief in reason. Third, it argues that, like Popper’s critical rationalism, Bartley’s pan-critical rationalism originates in the justified true belief account of knowledge, however, not because Bartley defines critical rationalism as irrational faith in reason, but because his theory does not tell us how an ‘open’ belief in reason is to be refuted logically. The reason for this failure is that Bartley uses Popper’s epistemology of science to define the conception of criticism. While Popper and Bartley are recognized as the non-justificationist philosophers of science and rationality, this article tries to reveal that the idea of objective knowledge as justified true belief has prevented them from showing how ‘a rational belief in reason’ can be defended by argument. The article also briefly shows the consequence of this study for a notable change in the logical foundations of science.

作为“对批评的开放性”的理性理论是否解决了“对理性的理性信仰”的问题？这是本文要解决的主要问题。我对这个问题的回答是，认为知识的正当化真实信念说明阻止了卡尔·波普尔的批判和威廉·巴特利的泛批判理性主义解决理性的理性信念问题。为了详细阐述这一回应，本文分三个阶段提出了它的论点：首先，它认为客观知识作为被证明的真实信念的想法导致了客观知识与证明的等式。因此，如果我们将批判理性主义理论作为对批评的开放性建立在这样一种知识概念之上，那么我们的理性理论就涉及到证明的无限倒退。第二，它认为，波普尔将批判理性主义描述为对批评持开放态度的“非理性态度”，因为理性主义者无法通过论证或经验证明他对理性的信仰是正当的。因此，既然波普尔假定“对理性的信仰”必须被证明是“理性的”，他就不能导致对理性的理性信仰问题的解决方案。第三，它认为，与波普尔的批判理性主义一样，巴特利的泛批判理性主义起源于对知识的正当化真信念说明，但这并不是因为巴特利将批判理性主义定义为对理性的非理性信仰，而是因为他的理论没有告诉我们如何对理性的“开放”信仰是在逻辑上被驳斥的。这种失败的原因是巴特利使用波普尔的科学认识论来定义批评的概念。虽然波普尔和巴特利被公认为科学和理性的非辩护主义哲学家，但本文试图揭示将客观知识作为被辩护的真实信念的想法阻碍了他们展示如何通过论证来捍卫“对理性的理性信念” . 本文还简要展示了这项研究对科学逻辑基础发生显着变化的结果。