Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being.

中文翻译：

---

新的幸福原子论

许多哲学家拒绝接受这样一种观点，即一生的幸福只是一个人生命中每一时刻的幸福的总和，因此他们拒绝像享乐主义和并发性欲望满足论这样的幸福理论。他们担心这种观点忽视了一个人生活中各个时刻之间的关系或叙事在一个人的幸福中所扮演的角色的重要性。在本文中，我们提出了一种幸福的原子论元理论，根据该理论，生命的审慎价值仅取决于生命中每个时刻的审慎价值。这是对瞬时幸福感的一般描述，它可以捕捉到标准原子论描述无法捕捉到的幸福感的不同特征，从而允许与各种幸福感理论兼容的原子论的可能性。