Does one's causal responsibility increase the degree of one's moral responsibility? The proponents of resultant moral luck hold that it does. Until quite recently, the causation literature has almost exclusively been interested in the binary question of whether one factor is a cause of an outcome. Naturally, the debate over resultant moral luck also revolved around this binary question. However, we have seen an increased interest in the question of degrees of causation in recent years. And some philosophers have already explored various implications of a graded notion of causation on resultant moral luck. In this paper, I will do the same. But the implications that I will draw attention to are bad news for resultant moral luck. I will show that resultant moral luck entails some implausible results that leave resultant moral luck more indefensible than it was previously thought be. I will also show that what is typically taken to be the positive argument in favor of resultant moral luck fails. I will conclude that we should reject resultant moral luck.

中文翻译：

---

反对由此产生的道德运气

一个人的因果责任是否增加了一个人的道德责任程度？结果道德运气的支持者认为确实如此。直到最近，因果关系文献几乎只对一个因素是否是结果的原因这一二元问题感兴趣。自然，关于由此产生的道德运气的争论也围绕着这个二元问题。然而，我们已经看到对学位问题的兴趣增加了近年来的因果关系。一些哲学家已经探索了因果关系分级概念对由此产生的道德运气的各种影响。在本文中，我也会这样做。但我将提请注意的含义对于由此产生的道德运气来说是个坏消息。我将证明，由此产生的道德运气会带来一些令人难以置信的结果，这些结果使由此产生的道德运气比以前认为的更加站不住脚。我还将表明，通常被视为支持由此产生的道德运气的积极论据是失败的。我将得出结论，我们应该拒绝由此产生的道德运气。