The problem of peer disagreement is to explain how you should respond when you and a peer have the same evidence bearing on some proposition $P$ and are equally competent epistemic agents, yet have reached opposite conclusions about $P$. According to Christensen's Independence Thesis, in assessing the effect of your peer's disagreement, you must not rely on the reasoning behind your initial belief. I note that ‘the reasoning behind your initial belief’ can be given either a token or type reading. I argue that the type reading is false, but the token reading is extremely weak.

中文翻译：

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分歧、独立论点和重复推理的价值

同行分歧的问题是解释当你和同行对某个命题有相同的证据时你应该如何回应$磷$是同样有能力的认知主体，但得出了相反的结论$磷$。根据克里斯滕森的独立论，在评估同伴的分歧的影响时，你不能依赖于你最初信念背后的推理。我注意到“你最初信念背后的推理”可以给出标记或类型读数。我认为类型读取是错误的，但令牌读取非常弱。