ABSTRACT

Overseas procurement aims not only to acquire the most high-end weapons systems, but also to enhance their technological expertise. However, the degree to which a procuring state succeeds in these dual objectives varies. Sometimes, a state acquires nearly the most advanced weapon systems in a timely manner with significant terms of technology transfer. At other times, a state’s procurement is fraught with a series of disadvantageous decisions on technology transfer, maintenance, and timeliness. From where does this variation in effectiveness emanate? This article argues that the key to explaining these variations is civil–military co-ordination. States can secure effectiveness when a civilian chief executive proactively capitalises on appointment authority and/or when proactive civil–military consultations transpire. For these causations, this article studies two major fighter jet procurement activities of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Korea Fighter Project (KFP) and the Fighter eXperimental-I (FX-I) programme.

摘要

海外采购的目的不仅是为了获得最高端的武器系统，而且是为了提高他们的技术专长。然而，采购国在实现这些双重目标方面的成功程度各不相同。有时，一个国家以重要的技术转让条款及时获得几乎最先进的武器系统。在其他时候，一个州的采购充满了一系列关于技术转让、维护和及时性的不利决定。这种有效性的差异从何而来？本文认为，解释这些差异的关键是军民协调。当文职行政长官主动利用任命权和/或主动进行军民协商时，国家可以确保有效性。对于这些因果，