The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the issue of mobilization policies, that is, government practices directed at making the mass public voluntarily perform various behaviors for the collective benefit during a crisis. As COVID-19 vaccinations became accessible, governments faced the challenge of mass vaccination mobilization in order to achieve herd immunization. Aiming to effectively realize this goal, policy designers and regulators worldwide considered various mobilizing tools for vaccination compliance, including rewards and penalties, as they targeted vaccine opposers and hesitators, while trying to avoid the crowding-out effect among individuals who were intrinsically motivated to get vaccinated. However, the unique circumstances of the Coronavirus pandemic may have eliminated the crowding-out effect. Thus, our study explored the effect of regulation in the form of positive and negative incentivizing tools (i.e., rewards and penalties) during the coronavirus pandemic on vaccination intentions of 1184 Israeli citizens, prior to the national vaccination campaign. Results indicate that (1) both negative and positive incentives have a similar positive effect on individuals who declare they will not get vaccinated and those who hesitate to get the shot; (2) both positive and negative incentives induce the crowding-out effect; and (3) negative incentives generate a larger crowding-out effect in individuals who report preliminary intentions to get vaccinated, compared to positive ones. This emphasizes the need to avoid the crowding-out effect during the current and similar crises, and suggests considering applying a gradual and adaptive policy design in order to maximize regulatory efficacy and compliance.

中文翻译：

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制定危机期间动员公民行为的政策：检验积极和消极的疫苗接种激励政策的影响

COVID-19 大流行凸显了动员政策的问题，即政府旨在让大众在危机期间为集体利益自愿采取各种行为的做法。随着 COVID-19 疫苗的普及，各国政府面临着动员大规模疫苗接种以实现群体免疫的挑战。为了有效实现这一目标，世界各地的政策制定者和监管机构考虑了各种动员疫苗接种合规性的工具，包括奖励和惩罚，因为他们针对的是疫苗反对者和犹豫者，同时试图避免在有内在动机的个人中产生挤出效应接种疫苗。然而，冠状病毒大流行的独特情况可能已经消除了挤出效应。因此，我们的研究探讨了在冠状病毒大流行期间以正面和负面激励工具（即奖励和惩罚）形式进行的监管对全国疫苗接种运动之前 1184 名以色列公民的疫苗接种意向的影响。结果表明：（1）消极和积极的激励对那些宣布他们不会接种疫苗的人和那些犹豫不决的人都有类似的积极影响；(2)正负激励均会产生挤出效应；(3) 与正面激励相比，负面激励对报告初步打算接种疫苗的个人产生更大的挤出效应。这强调了在当前和类似危机期间避免挤出效应的必要性，