FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.

FASB 的 ASU 2011-05 要求综合收益 (CI) 和其他综合收益 (OCI) 在业绩报表（单一损益表或单独的综合收益表）而非权益报表中报告。采用 ASU 2011-05 的差异研究设计作为处理，我发现在不同的报表中呈现会计信息会影响银行盈余管理，特别是在绩效报表中呈现 CI 和 OCI（尤其是在具有净收入的单一报表中） ) 通过选择性出售银行业的可供出售 (AFS) 证券来减少盈余管理。我还发现 ASU 2011-05 的影响主要是对 CEO 薪酬方案中股权激励较高或 CEO 工作保障较少的银行。其他分析表明，CI 和 OCI 的绩效报告提高了 AFS 证券已实现损益的预测能力；然而，当银行不得不减少选择性出售 AFS 证券时，它们可能会管理贷款损失准备金作为替代策略。