We consider the Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) contracts for a newly built road within a transportation network which includes another existing free access road. We consider a standard BOT contract in which the firm builds and operates the new road in the concession period and then transfers it to the government in the post-concession period. We find that the government may not prefer the length of concession period as long as possible. Next, we consider a coordinated BOT contract between the government and the firm to form a board to build and operate the new road over the whole life. In such a case, we transform a bi-objective programming problem as a weighted sum of the profit of firm and social welfare of the society. We find that social welfare may not always increase with the government’s weight. Besides, if the government weight is low, the coordinated BOT contract will lead to a wider road than the standard BOT contract, even if the construction cost is high. If the government weight is high, the coordinated BOT contract will lead to a wider road if the construction cost is very low. In other cases, the coordinated BOT contract leads to a narrower road compared to the standard BOT contract.

我们考虑了交通网络内新建道路的建设-运营-移交 (BOT) 合同，其中包括另一条现有的免费通道。我们考虑一个标准的 BOT 合同，在该合同中，公司在特许经营期内建造和运营新道路，然后在特许经营期后将其转让给政府。我们发现，政府可能不希望特许期越长越好。接下来，我们考虑政府和公司之间的协调 BOT 合同，组成一个董事会，在整个生命周期内建设和运营这条新道路。在这种情况下，我们将双目标规划问题转换为企业利润和社会福利的加权和。我们发现社会福利可能并不总是随着政府的权重而增加。此外，如果政府权重较低，即使建设成本很高，协调 BOT 合同也将导致比标准 BOT 合同更宽的道路。如果政府权重很高，如果建设成本很低，协调的 BOT 合同将导致更宽的道路。在其他情况下，与标准 BOT 合约相比，协调 BOT 合约导致的道路更窄。