Enterprises commonly make charitable donations to attract customers to purchase their products. We explore the supply chain coordination problem with charitable donation via a Stackelberg game, wherein the e-commerce platform is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. The former sells the products and decides the commission, whereas the latter determines the charitable donation investment and price. We investigate the charitable donation and pricing strategies in a centralized and decentralized system, and obtain the following insights. (1) The donation and pricing strategies hinges on the proportion of prosocial customers and the donation cost coefficient. (2) Donation can increase the product price and the supply chain performance, unlike non-donation. (3) In the decentralized system with extremely profitable market conditions, charitable donation will aggravate the competition in the supply chain, which benefits the e-commerce platform but hurts the manufacturer. Nonetheless, under certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be automatically realized. (4) A simple two-part tariff contract can perfectly coordinate the supply chain.

企业通常通过慈善捐赠来吸引顾客购买他们的产品。我们通过 Stackelberg 博弈探讨慈善捐赠的供应链协调问题，其中电子商务平台是领导者，制造商是跟随者。前者销售产品并决定佣金，后者决定慈善捐赠的投资和价格。我们在集中式和分散式系统中调查慈善捐赠和定价策略，并获得以下见解。(1) 捐赠和定价策略取决于亲社会客户的比例和捐赠成本系数。(2) 与非捐赠不同，捐赠可以提高产品价格和供应链性能。(3) 在市场条件极其有利可图的去中心化系统中，慈善捐赠会加剧供应链竞争，对电商平台有利，对厂商不利。尽管如此，在一定条件下，供应链的协调是可以自动实现的。(4) 一个简单的两部分关税合同可以完美地协调供应链。