This paper is about a tension between two theses. The first is Value of Evidence: roughly, the thesis that it is always rational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence for making decisions. The second is Rationality of Imprecision: the thesis that an agent can be rationally required to adopt doxastic states that are imprecise, i.e., not representable by a single credence function. While others have noticed this tension, I offer a new diagnosis of it. I show that it arises when an agent with an imprecise doxastic state engages in an unreflective inquiry, an inquiry where they revise their beliefs using an updating rule that doesn't satisfy a weak reflection principle. In such an unreflective inquiry, certain synchronic norms of instrumental rationality can make it instrumentally irrational for an agent to gather and use cost-free evidence. I then go on to propose a diachronic norm of instrumental rationality that preserves Value of Evidence in unreflective inquiries. This, I suggest, may help us reconcile this thesis with Rationality of Imprecision.

中文翻译：

---

信条的不精确性和证据的价值

本文是关于两个论文之间的紧张关系。第一个是证据的价值：粗略地说，该论点认为代理人收集和使用免费证据来做出决策总是理性的。第二个是不精确的理性：该论点可以合理地要求主体采用不精确的信念状态，即不能用单个信任函数来表示。虽然其他人已经注意到这种紧张关系，但我对此提出了新的诊断。我表明，当一个具有不精确信念状态的代理人进行不加反思的调查时，就会出现这种情况，这是一项调查，他们使用不满足弱反射原则的更新规则来修改他们的信念。在这种未经反思的调查中，工具理性的某些同步规范可能会使代理人收集和使用免费证据变得工具非理性。然后，我继续提出工具理性的历时规范，在不加反思的调查中保留证据的价值。我认为，这可能有助于我们使这篇论文与不精确的理性相一致。