Many philosophers believe that the criteria of identity over time for ordinary objects entail that such objects are permanent members of certain sortal kinds. The sortal kinds in question have come to be known as substance sortal kinds. But in this article, I defend a criterion of identity that is suited to phasalism, the view that alleged substance sortals are in fact phase sortals. The criterion I defend is a sortal-weighted version of a change-minimizing criterion first discussed by Eli Hirsch. I present this criterion and then argue that it withstands attempts to show that it is inferior to non-phasalist rivals.

中文翻译：

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无排序的身份标准

许多哲学家认为，随着时间的推移，普通物体的同一性标准意味着这些物体是某些类别的永久成员。所讨论的类别类型已被称为物质类别类型。但在这篇文章中，我捍卫了一个适合相论的同一性标准，即所谓的物质分类实际上是相分类的观点。我所捍卫的标准是 Eli Hirsch 首次讨论的变化最小化标准的排序加权版本。我提出了这个标准，然后认为它经得起证明它不如非阶段论竞争对手的尝试。