ABSTRACT

This study examines why citizens re-elect corrupt mayors, adopting a conceptual framework that considers two mitigating factors in punishing corrupt leaders: first, a strong relationship between the mayor and the citizens; second, a low level of corruption that may be considered negligible by the citizens. Both factors are contingent on local contexts. Thus, the study investigates in clustered local contexts, the impact of variables related to the mayor-citizen (taking account of the duration of the political career, party membership and trasformismo/party-switching) and the level of corruption on mayoral re-election. The results shows that the relationship between the mayor and the citizens is a mitigating factor that works homogeneously across contexts, albeit based on different factors. With regard to low levels of corruption as a mitigating factor, evidence of this is found only in medium and highly developed communities. The theoretical and policy implications are examined.

摘要

本研究考察了为什么公民会重新选举腐败的市长，采用了一个概念框架，该框架考虑了惩罚腐败领导人的两个减轻因素：首先，市长与公民之间的牢固关系；第二，腐败程度低，公民可能认为可以忽略不计。这两个因素都取决于当地情况。因此，该研究调查了在聚集的地方背景下，与市长-公民相关的变量的影响（考虑到政治生涯的持续时间、党员身份和transformismo /党派转换）以及市长连任的腐败程度。结果表明，市长与市民之间的关系是一个缓解因素，尽管基于不同的因素，但它在不同的背景下同样起作用。关于将低程度的腐败作为一个缓解因素，只有在中等和高度发达的社区才能找到这方面的证据。研究了理论和政策影响。