Following a brief review of the management of environmental externalities under strategic interactions in the traditional temporal domain, results are extended to the spatiotemporal domain. Conditions for spatial open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria, along with conditions for the benchmark cooperative solution, are presented and compared. A simplified numerical example illustrates the spatial patterns emerging at a steady state under Fickian diffusion and dispersal kernels, and the inefficiency of spatially flat emission taxes. This conceptual framework could provide new research areas.

中文翻译：

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关于环境存量外部性的优化管理。

在对传统时间域中战略交互下的环境外部性管理进行简要回顾之后，将结果扩展到时空域。提出并比较了空间开环和反馈纳什均衡的条件，以及基准合作解决方案的条件。一个简化的数值示例说明了在 Fickian 扩散和扩散核下以稳定状态出现的空间模式，以及空间平坦排放税的低效率。这个概念框架可以提供新的研究领域。