what first interrupted Kant’s dogmatic slumber presupposes that Kant considered it a keystone of metaphysics. In 1755 he made the attempt of proving a particular version of that principle valid for the cause of contingently existing things. In the early 1760s he rejected this view, and there is no evidence that his pre-Critical conception of metaphysics was essentially connected with and based upon the principle of sufficient reason. Anderson emphasizes that the principle in this ‘unrestricted’ version applied to things beyond experience (cf. pp. xiv–xv), but this holds as well for the metaphysical concepts of pure reason in the Inaugural Dissertation (2: 395), and in any case the principle is not mentioned there at all. Anderson claims that ‘Hume roused Kant by challenging the unrestricted principle of sufficient reason, since it is this principle that is used in theology, to prove the existence of God’ (p. xv), but the theological use of the principle was not at the very centre of the pre-Critical notion of metaphysics. Kant’s own proof of the existence of God is a so-called ‘ontological proof’ in the Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund, published in 1763, and does not invoke that principle. Anderson claims that this text contains ‘an attack on theology’ (p. 86), and that it is ‘clearly influenced by Hume’s critique of theology’ (pp. 161–2), but he gives no arguments for these claims. Thus, there is no evidence that Kant was roused by Hume through his alleged challenge to the principle of sufficient reason. The story told by Kant about the interruption of his dogmatic slumber in the preface of the Prolegomena leads easily to the view that Hume was in some way his ‘predecessor’ (4: 260). But only two pages later we are told by Kant that he considered his own approach as an alternative to Hume’s way of proceeding (4: 262). Later on he compares the account of the connection between cause and experience, given by Hume, with his own account and points out that the latter is ‘a completely reversed type of connection that never occurred to Hume’ (4: 313). Thus, even in the Prolegomena Kant presents Hume not only as a ‘predecessor’, but as a real and fundamental alternative – a view which is very much emphasized in the second edition of the Critique (B127–8). Regrettably, the simple picture of Kant ‘as a devoted heir to Hume’ (p. xx) or of Hume as ‘the forerunner of the Critique’ (p. 158) neither accounts for the differing assessments of the Critical Kant, nor does it allow for an adequate understanding of the variety of problems the pre-Critical Kant attempted to solve.

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Paul Guyer，《门德尔松和康德牛津的理性和经验》：牛津大学出版社，2020 页。368 ISBN 9780198850335 (hbk) £40.00

最初打断康德教条式沉睡的前提是康德认为它是形而上学的基石。1755 年，他试图证明该原理的特定版本对偶然存在的事物的原因有效。在 1760 年代初期，他拒绝了这一观点，并且没有证据表明他的前批判形而上学概念本质上与充足理由原则相关并且基于充足理由原则。安德森强调，这个“不受限制的”版本中的原则适用于超越经验的事物（参见第 xiv-xv 页），但这也适用于就职论文（2:395）中的纯粹理性的形而上学概念，以及无论如何，那里根本没有提到该原则。安德森声称“休谟通过挑战充分理由的无限制原则激起了康德，因为在神学中使用这个原理来证明上帝的存在”（p. xv），但该原理的神学用途并不是前批判形而上学概念的核心。康德自己对上帝存在的证明是 1763 年出版的 Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund 中所谓的“本体论证明”，并没有援引该原则。安德森声称该文本包含“对神学的攻击”（第 86 页），并且“明显受到休谟对神学的批判的影响”（第 161-2 页），但他没有为这些主张提供任何论据。因此，没有证据表明康德是因为休谟对充分理由原则的所谓挑战而激怒了他。康德在序言中讲述了他教条式的沉睡被打断的故事，这很容易让人认为休谟在某种程度上是他的“前任”（4：260）。但仅在两页之后，康德就告诉我们，他认为自己的方法可以替代休谟的方法（4：262）。后来，他将休谟对原因和经验之间联系的描述与他自己的描述进行了比较，并指出后者是“一种完全颠倒的联系，休谟从未想过”（4：313）。因此，即使在序言中，康德也将休谟不仅作为“前辈”，而且作为一个真正的和基本的替代品——这一观点在《批判》第二版（B127-8）中得到了非常强调。令人遗憾的是，康德“作为休谟的忠实继承人”的简单描述（第 10 页）。