Karin de Boer’s latest book is an ambitious work that is destined to provoke a lively debate within the Kantian community. The thesis underlying the book is simple, very clearly expressed and systematically developed throughout its eight chapters. As the title already hints, the author challenges ‘the assumption that the Critique of Pure Reason destroyed metaphysics’, as well as the idea that ‘it established a “metaphysics of experience” and eradicated any “transcendent”metaphysics’ (p. 3). The author considers it crucial to distinguish between a ‘revolution’, to be understood as Kant’s departure from the structure of Wolffian metaphysics, and a ‘reform’ which, while preserving its basic intentions, corrects this structure by limiting its unwarranted claims, setting it on the path of a true science. This approach situates de Boer within the tradition of interpreters like Pichler, Wundt, Heimsoeth and Heidegger rather than that of Strawson or Kemp Smith. Even so, de Boer’s reading remains highly original. Taking as her guiding thread Kant’s clues in the Architectonic about the characteristics of the metaphysical system for which the CPR is supposed to be the propaedeutic, and focusing her attention on the Transcendental Analytic, she describes how the system designed by Kant offers a general metaphysics (ontology) and a special metaphysics, amended in the light of critical scrutiny, but not dissimilar in content from Wolff’s metaphysics. In chapter 1, the author surveys the post-Leibnizian context in which Kant grew up and moved, focusing on Wolff’s metaphysics. Through a selection of passages taken not only from the first Critique, but also from letters, lectures and Reflexionen, she contends that, although Wolff did not succeed in developing his metaphysics in accordance with the scientific model that he had imposed upon himself, it is nevertheless ‘Wolffian metaphysics [that] is the main subtext of Kant’s account of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason’ (p. 21). The author is forthright in admitting that her presentation of Wolff’s views is not neutral, but rather oriented by her interpretation of its reception by Kant, and this is reflected in some of her methodological choices, such as disregarding Wolff’s Latin works, which nonetheless must occasionally be referred to in order to clarify the framework of the analysis (see, for instance, p. 25). On the anti-Wolffian side, de Boer considers Crusius, whose metaphysics is to be seen in an essentially theological light and as preoccupied with moral issues, but from whom Kant would draw a sort of intellectual modesty aimed at limiting the legitimate range of the action of our understanding. However, Crusius, like Wolff, does not escape the tendency to delve into empty speculations about the soul and God. Both figures are objects of Kant’s criticism insofar as each is guilty of an error which de Boer labels as ‘continuism’, namely the assumption ‘that sensibility and thought are nothing but two ways in which we can come to know things’ (p. 39).

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Karin de Boer，康德的形而上学改革：重新考虑纯粹理性的批判剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2020 Pp。x + 280 ISBN 9781108842174 (hbk) $99.99

Karin de Boer 的最新著作是一部雄心勃勃的作品，注定会在康德社区内引发一场激烈的辩论。这本书的基本论点很简单，表达得非常清楚，并在其八章中系统地展开。正如标题已经暗示的那样，作者挑战了“纯粹理性批判摧毁了形而上学的假设”，以及“它建立了“经验的形而上学”并根除任何“超越的”形而上学的想法（第 3 页） . 作者认为区分“革命”（被理解为康德对沃尔夫形而上学结构的背离）和“改革”之间的区别至关重要，“改革”在保留其基本意图的同时，通过限制其无根据的主张来纠正这种结构，设置它走上真正的科学之路。这种方法将德布尔置于 Pichler、Wundt、Heimsoeth 和 Heidegger 等解释者的传统中，而不是 Strawson 或 Kemp Smith 的传统中。即便如此，de Boer 的阅读仍然具有很高的原创性。她以康德在《建筑学》中关于以 CPR 为先导的形而上学系统的特征的线索为指导线索，并将注意力集中在先验分析上，描述了康德设计的系统如何提供一般的形而上学（本体论）和一种特殊的形而上学，根据批判性审查进行了修正，但在内容上与沃尔夫的形而上学并无不同。在第一章中，作者考察了康德成长和发展的后莱布尼茨时代背景，重点关注沃尔夫的形而上学。通过选择不仅来自第一个批评的段落，她还从书信、讲座和反思中争辩说，尽管沃尔夫没有按照他强加给自己的科学模式成功地发展他的形而上学，但“沃尔夫的形而上学 [that] 是康德的主要潜台词” 《纯粹理性批判》中对形而上学的解释（第 21 页）。作者直截了当地承认，她对沃尔夫观点的表述并非中立，而是以她对康德接受的解释为导向，这反映在她的一些方法论选择上，例如无视沃尔夫的拉丁作品，尽管如此，有时还是必须这样做以阐明分析框架（例如，参见第 25 页）。在反沃尔夫方面，德波尔认为克鲁修斯，他的形而上学本质上应该从神学的角度来看待，并且专注于道德问题，但康德会从他身上汲取一种智力上的谦虚，旨在限制我们理解行为的合法范围。然而，克鲁修斯和沃尔夫一样，并没有摆脱对灵魂和上帝进行空洞推测的倾向。这两个数字都是康德批评的对象，因为每个人都犯了被德波尔称为“连续性”的错误，即假设“感性和思想只不过是我们可以了解事物的两种方式”（第 39 页） ）。并没有摆脱对灵魂和上帝进行空洞推测的倾向。这两个数字都是康德批评的对象，因为每个人都犯了被德波尔称为“连续性”的错误，即假设“感性和思想只不过是我们可以了解事物的两种方式”（第 39 页） ）。并没有摆脱对灵魂和上帝进行空洞推测的倾向。这两个数字都是康德批评的对象，因为每个人都犯了被德波尔称为“连续性”的错误，即假设“感性和思想只不过是我们可以了解事物的两种方式”（第 39 页） ）。