Abstract This article examines the artistic potential of forms of image-making that involve registering the features of real objects using mind-independent processes. According to skeptics, these processes limit an agent’s intentional control over the features of the resultant “automatic images,” which in turn limits the artistic potential of the work, and the form as a whole. I argue that this is true only if intentional control is understood to mean that an agent produces the features of the work by their own bodily movements alone. Not only is this an unrealistic standard to uphold, but I show that a definition of intentional control based on the skeptic’s position does not prohibit an agent from realizing the features of an image by means beyond their own actions. An agent can exercise intentional control over the features of an image if they successfully anticipate the effect that the remote consequences of their actions will have on these. This, I argue, entails that to exert intentional control over the features of an image is to exercise “creative agency,” which is a species of executive agency. Consequently, I defend the idea that the origin of automatic images in creative agency grounds their artistic significance.

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创意机构作为执行机构：为自动图像的艺术意义奠定基础

摘要 本文探讨了图像制作形式的艺术潜力，其中涉及使用独立于思维的过程来记录真实物体的特征。根据怀疑论者的说法，这些过程限制了代理人对产生的“自动图像”特征的有意控制，这反过来又限制了作品的艺术潜力和整体形式。我认为，只有当有意控制被理解为代理人仅通过他们自己的身体运动来产生作品的特征时，这才是正确的。这不仅是一个不切实际的标准，而且我表明，基于怀疑论者立场的有意控制的定义并不禁止代理人通过超越他们自己的行为的方式来实现图像的特征。如果代理成功地预测了他们的行为的远程后果将对这些特征产生的影响，他们就可以对图像的特征进行有意识的控制。我认为，这意味着对图像的特征施加有意识的控制就是行使“创造性代理”，这是一种执行代理。因此，我捍卫创意机构中自动图像的起源基于其艺术意义的观点。