Abstract Nathan Salmon has defended what might be called “weak modal anti-realism”—the view that possible-object names can refer to possible objects that neither exist nor are otherwise real. But rather than adopting a similar view in the fictional case, he instead defends fictional creationism—the view that fictional characters are existent but abstract entities created by authors of fiction. In this paper, I first argue that if weak modal antirealism is defensible then weak fictional antirealism is defensible as well. Second, I argue that there is no reason to prefer fictional creationism over weak fictional antirealism but there is very good reason to prefer the latter over the former. And third, I defend weak fictional antirealism against the charge that it cannot provide a satisfactory account of statements that prima facie involve reference to or quantification over fictional characters.

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未选择的虚构之路：一种弱的反现实主义小说理论

摘要 Nathan Salmon 捍卫了可能被称为“弱模态反实在论”的观点——可能对象名称可以指代既不存在也不真实的可能对象。但他没有在虚构案例中采用类似的观点，而是为虚构创造论辩护——认为虚构人物是存在的，但由小说作者创造的抽象实体。在本文中，我首先论证如果弱模态反实在论是可辩护的，那么弱虚构反实在论也是可辩护的。其次，我认为没有理由更喜欢虚构的创造论而不是弱虚构的反现实主义，但有很好的理由更喜欢后者而不是前者。第三，