played a heroic role in 1954, helping to organize and then co-chairing a conference in Geneva that ended the Indochina crisis without military intervention, by means of agreements that featured a ceasefire in the war and a set of accommodations between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Ruane and Jones reject as phony the claim that the United States never really intended to intervene in Indochina. The importance of this book (which might more manageably be titled just Anthony Eden) is that the authors have mined the record in depth to show how Eden’s steadfast opposition to the U.S. intervention bid really did stop Eisenhower and Dulles from bullying their way into war. Ruane and Jones argue that Eden feared the Indochina crisis could lead to nuclear war, a fear that stoked his determination to foil U.S. plans to internationalize the conflict (p. 255). Along the way the authors present British policy—and its effects on Washington’s enterprise—in exhaustive detail. This is the most important treatment of the Dien Bien Phu crisis that has appeared in a very long time. Do not miss it. Ruane and Jones do one better, though. They push ahead to Suez and actually attempt to contrast Eden in the annus mirabilis of 1954 with the year of disaster 1956. Interestingly enough, they dismiss claims of a linkage between the Dien Bien Phu and Suez crises. “It makes greater sense,” the authors conclude, “to root Eden’s Suez decision-making—including his mistakes and misjudgments—wholly in 1956” (p. 261). The authors also reject the idea that Dulles sought revenge in the Suez crisis for the U.S. failure at Dien Bien Phu. In Eden’s memoir Full Circle he devotes more than a hundred pages to the Indochina war, including the full trajectory of the conflict, the conferences at Berlin and Geneva, and intervention. That public account, published in 1960, is ably confirmed in this book. Those who have constructed artificial visions that exalt Eisenhower and denigrate Eden now have an evidentiary mountain to climb.

中文翻译：

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东京湾与越南战争的升级

1954 年发挥了英勇的作用，帮助组织并共同主持了在日内瓦举行的一次会议，该会议在没有军事干预的情况下结束了印度支那危机，通过的协议包括战争停火和法国和民主共和国之间的一系列和解越南的。Ruane 和 Jones 认为美国从未真正打算干预印度支那的说法是虚假的。这本书（可能更容易命名为安东尼·伊登）的重要性在于作者深入挖掘了记录，以展示伊登坚决反对美国干预竞标的做法确实阻止了艾森豪威尔和杜勒斯恃强凌弱进入战争。Ruane 和 Jones 认为，Eden 担心印度支那危机可能导致核战争，这种恐惧激发了他挫败美国的决心 冲突国际化的计划（第 255 页）。在此过程中，作者详尽地介绍了英国的政策及其对华盛顿企业的影响。这是长期以来出现的奠边府危机最重要的治疗方法。别错过。不过，Ruane 和 Jones 做得更好。他们向苏伊士推进，实际上试图将 1954 年的伊甸园与 1956 年的灾难年进行对比。有趣的是，他们驳斥了奠边府和苏伊士危机之间存在联系的说法。“这更有意义，”作者总结道，“将伊甸园的苏伊士决策——包括他的错误和误判——根植于 1956 年”（第 261 页）。作者还反对杜勒斯在苏伊士危机中为美国在奠边府的失败寻求报复的想法。在 Eden 的回忆录 Full Circle 中，他用一百多页的篇幅讲述了印度支那战争，包括冲突的完整轨迹、柏林和日内瓦的会议以及干预。1960年出版的那个公众号，在本书中得到了巧妙的印证。那些创造了高举艾森豪威尔和诋毁伊甸园的人造愿景的人现在有一座证据山要攀登。