Most of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) contains a cooling-off period provision requiring both parties to an investment dispute to make an attempt to settle their differences amicably within a clear time frame, before initiating arbitration. The cooling-off period is triggered by the notice of dispute sent by the investor to the host-State and can range from several months up to one year. At times arbitral tribunals have considered this provision as an optional procedural requirement, others, as a condition precedent for tribunals’ jurisdiction. In either case, tribunals have exclusively focused on the consequences for the investor, whenever the investor had not complied with this waiting period by filing the arbitration prior to its elapse. However, can the cooling-off provision be construed as a procedural standard of investment protection whenever the Respondent-State does not comply with this provision by refusing to engage in consultations with the investor? This article argues so by examining the function, character and content of this provision and by shifting the focal point of arbitral precedents. Indeed, from the investor’s perspective, this provision may well be a treaty-based procedural standard of investment protection to find a cost-effective and prompt solution to a dispute whose breach may call for redress.

中文翻译：

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将冷静条款理论化为投资保护的附加标准

大多数国际投资协议 (IIA) 都包含冷静期条款，要求投资争议双方在启动仲裁之前，在明确的时间框架内尝试友好解决分歧。冷静期由投资者向东道国发出的争议通知触发，范围从几个月到一年不等。有时，仲裁庭将这一条款视为一项可选的程序要求，而另一些则将其视为仲裁庭管辖权的先决条件。在任何一种情况下，只要投资者在等待期结束前未通过提交仲裁来遵守此等待期，仲裁庭就会专门关注对投资者的后果。然而，如果被诉国拒绝与投资者进行磋商而不遵守该规定，是否可以将冷静期规定解释为投资保护的程序标准？本文通过考察该规定的功能、性质和内容，并通过转移仲裁判例的焦点来论证这一点。事实上，从投资者的角度来看，该条款很可能是一项基于条约的投资保护程序标准，以便为违反可能需要补救的争端找到具有成本效益和迅速的解决方案。