Producers frequently provide retailers with financial incentives to secure product distribution. These payments often take the form of vendor allowances: lump-sum transfers to retailers that do not directly depend on quantity sold. I introduce an estimation strategy that uses observed product selections to inform unobserved allowances. I use retailers’ replacement threats, which may allow them to capture both vendor transfers and lower wholesale prices. A counterfactual restricts firms to contract on only wholesale prices. Results show that vendor allowances may have not only (negative) product distortion effects but also (potentially positive) pricing effects.

中文翻译：

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具有内生产品选择的纵向合同：供应商补贴合同的实证分析

生产商经常为零售商提供经济激励以确保产品分销。这些付款通常采取供应商补贴的形式：一次性转移给不直接取决于销售数量的零售商。我介绍了一种估计策略，该策略使用观察到的产品选择来告知未观察到的容差。我使用零售商的替换威胁，这可能使他们能够捕获供应商转移和降低批发价格。反事实限制公司仅以批发价格签订合同。结果表明，供应商补贴可能不仅（负面）产品扭曲效应，而且（潜在正面）定价效应。