When are states more likely to increase, decrease, or maintain domestic regulations when these regulations are contested in trade negotiations by domestic and foreign actors? This variation in negotiating outcomes is what Competitiveness and Death attempts to explain. Winslett approaches the politics behind regulatory barriers in trade negotiations as a function of the interplay between three different actors that align themselves along two major concerns or frames: competitiveness and death. Using these two frames, he traces the success or failure of firm and activist efforts to influence government officials in either increasing or decreasing regulatory trade barriers. He argues that the existence or absence of regulatory trade barriers depends crucially on a complex but predictable interplay between the commercial motivations of firms who frame their interests along concerns over competitiveness, and the societal interests of activists that frame their pursuits in terms of avoiding meaningless death. Policy-makers are the tiebreakers, and side either with firms or activists when their interests are opposed. The case studies in this book trace the interactions between these three actors across different trade negotiations that involved regulatory barriers to trade. Winslett’s focus on regulatory barriers to trade reflects and is inspired by the regulatory turn in trade politics which emerged with the codification of non-tariff barriers in the Tokyo round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and gained prominence with the negotiation of the SPS and TBT Agreements during the Uruguay Round. This book starts by introducing a framework for explaining trade policy outcomes applicable to regulatory trade barriers, and is succeeded by a chapter laying out how regulations became the crux of trade politics. Chapter 3 develops the argument, the motivations of the different actors, and the author’s main expectations. It is the central theoretical chapter and Winslett returns to it often in the empirical chapters that follow to create an integrated narrative. Chapters 4 to 7 tackle three overarching cases in depth, starting with regulations on cars, followed by regulatory barriers put in place to address the outbreak of mad-cow disease, and finally sticks the landing with Intellectual Property (IP) regulation and the trade of pharmaceuticals. Taken at face value, Winslett’s overarching argument is quite straightforward: he expects that businesses will be more successful at convincing policy-makers to remove regulatory barriers to trade if they can connect this goal to competitiveness frames. Activists are more likely to convince policy-makers to uphold or increase regulatory barriers if they can convincingly argue that it prevents needless death (p. 9). These two propositions are co-occurrent: throughout the case studies, businesses and activists are shown to be pulling in opposite directions. The outcome of trade

中文翻译：

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竞争力与死亡：汽车、牛肉和毒品的贸易与政治，G. Winslett 密歇根大学出版社，2021 年

当国内和国外参与者在贸易谈判中对这些法规提出质疑时，各州何时更有可能增加、减少或维持国内法规？谈判结果的这种差异正是竞争与死亡试图解释的。温斯莱特将贸易谈判中监管壁垒背后的政治视为三个不同参与者之间相互作用的函数，这些参与者遵循两个主要问题或框架：竞争力和死亡。使用这两个框架，他追踪了坚定和激进主义努力影响政府官员增加或减少监管贸易壁垒的成功或失败。他认为，监管贸易壁垒的存在与否在很大程度上取决于复杂但可预测的相互作用，企业的商业动机将其利益置于对竞争力的关注之上，而积极分子的社会利益则将其追求避免无意义的死亡。 . 政策制定者是决胜局的人，当他们的利益受到反对时，他们要么站在公司或激进分子一边。本书中的案例研究追溯了这三个参与者在涉及贸易监管壁垒的不同贸易谈判中的相互作用。温斯莱特对贸易监管壁垒的关注反映并受到贸易政治监管转向的启发，这种转向伴随着关贸总协定东京回合中非关税壁垒的编纂而出现，并在关税和贸易总协定（GATT）谈判中获得了突出地位。乌拉圭回合期间的 SPS 和 TBT 协议。本书首先介绍了一个框架来解释适用于监管贸易壁垒的贸易政策结果，随后的一章阐述了监管如何成为贸易政治的症结。第 3 章阐述了论点、不同参与者的动机以及作者的主要期望。它是中心理论章节，温斯莱特经常在随后的实证章节中回到它，以创建一个完整的叙述。第 4 章至第 7 章深入处理三个总体案例，从汽车法规开始，然后是为应对疯牛病爆发而设置的监管壁垒，最后是知识产权（IP）法规和贸易药品。从表面上看，温斯莱特的总体论点非常直截了当：他预计，如果企业能够将这一目标与竞争力框架联系起来，企业将更成功地说服政策制定者消除贸易监管壁垒。如果活动家能够令人信服地证明它可以防止不必要的死亡（第 9 页），他们更有可能说服政策制定者支持或增加监管壁垒。这两个命题是同时出现的：在整个案例研究中，企业和活动家被证明是在朝着相反的方向发展。