Abstract In recent years, the notion of a ‘right to hope’ has emerged in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article offers an account of how this right has been constructed and of how hope is conceptualised in European human rights law. It examines the origins of the ‘right to hope’, the meaning of hope in this context and the relationship that is depicted between hope and dignity. It argues that hope is conceived of here as relational and that one way of thinking about the right to hope in this sense is as a right to recognition. This has two dimensions: one involving the recognition of the individual by others and another involving the recognition of the individual in and through law. The latter implies a certain relationship of dependency between the individual and European human rights law, with hope itself coming to be constructed as an individual responsibility.

中文翻译：

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希望的关系：欧洲人权法中的“希望权”理论

摘要 近年来，“希望权”的概念出现在欧洲人权法院的判例中。本文介绍了这项权利是如何构建的，以及希望如何在欧洲人权法中被概念化。它考察了“希望的权利”的起源、希望在这种情况下的意义以及希望与尊严之间的关系。它认为希望在这里被认为是关系的，并且在这种意义上思考希望的权利的一种方式是作为一种承认的权利。这有两个方面：一个涉及他人对个人的承认，另一个涉及在法律中和通过法律对个人的承认。后者意味着个人与欧洲人权法之间存在某种依赖关系，