Abstract In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities (ficta) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and applying to a restricted or an unrestricted domain of beings. In (2003), Walton has criticized this treatment with respect to singular negative existentials in particular. First of all, however, as (Predelli, Stefano. 2002. ‘Holmes’ and Holmes. A Millian analysis of names from fiction. Dialectica 56. 261–279) has shown, this treatment can be applied to singular predications in general, independently of the existential case. Moreover, not only does applying it to singular negative existentials explain why we may contextually use the quantifier restrictedly in general negative existentials, but also it accounts for why comparative negative existentials, both singular and general, may have different truth values as well depending on the comparison group they mobilize.

中文翻译：

---

消极存在主义的语境主义处理

摘要在本文中，我想证明人工制品主义者通常对虚构实体 (ficta) 对一般和单一否定存在主义应用的语境主义处理是正确的。根据这种处理，否定存在的真值，无论是一般的还是单数的，都根据存在量词或一阶存在谓词在上下文中是否分别用于范围和适用于受限或非受限的存在者域而变化. 在（2003 年）中，沃尔顿批评了这种处理方式，尤其是针对单一的否定存在主义。然而，首先，正如（Predelli, Stefano. 2002. 'Holmes' and Holmes. A Millian analysis of names from stories. Dialectica 56. 261-279）所表明的，这种处理通常可以应用于单数谓词，独立于存在的情况。此外，将它应用于奇异否定存在主义不仅解释了为什么我们可以在一般否定存在主义中限制性地使用量词，而且它解释了为什么比较否定存在主义，无论是奇异的还是一般的，都可能具有不同的真值，这取决于他们动员的对照组。