Abstract We intuitively make a distinction between lying and misleading. As several philosophers have pointed out, on the account of this distinction favored here – the adverbial account, as I’ll call it – it provides evidence on the theoretical notion of what is said and the related theoretical distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For, on that account, the distinction tracks whether or not the content and the assertoric force with which it is presented are semantically conveyed. On an alternative (assertoric) commitment account, the difference between lying and misleading is predicated instead on the strength of assertoric commitment. One lies when one presents with full assertoric commitment what one believes to be false; one merely misleads when one presents it with short-of-full assertoric commitment, by merely hinting or otherwise implying it. Here I’ll present the debate confronting the two accounts, and I’ll provide support for the adverbial account and its methodological application.

中文翻译：

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说谎与误导：状语帐户

摘要 我们直观地区分了说谎和误导。正如几位哲学家所指出的那样，由于这里所支持的这种区分——我将称之为状语解释——它为所说的理论概念以及语义学和语用学之间相关的理论区别提供了证据。因为，基于这个原因，区别跟踪其呈现的内容和断言力量是否在语义上传达。在另一种（断言的）承诺帐户中，撒谎和误导之间的区别取决于断言承诺的强度。当一个人以完全断言的承诺提出一个他认为是错误的事情时，一个人撒谎；当一个人提出一个缺乏完整的断言承诺时，一个人只会误导它，通过仅仅暗示​​或以其他方式暗示它。在这里，我将介绍两种叙述所面临的争论，并为状语叙述及其方法论应用提供支持。