In this article, I consider the degree to which criminal justice interventions may be expected to ameliorate systemic corruption. I distinguish between two ideal types of corrupt actors – conditional cooperators and autonomous defectors – and argue that the prospects of reform through criminal justice are greatly affected by the relative preponderance of each type. When conditional cooperators predominate, the criminal law serves primarily to provide assurance that a perceived social norm is effective, in that the norm is both widely adhered to, and adhered to because people endorse the propriety of that norm. When autonomous defectors predominate, the criminal law serves primarily to deter would-be cheaters by attaching costs, at least in expectation, to cheating. Because patterns of compliance based upon a social norm tend to be self-reinforcing, unlike patterns of compliance motivated by fear of sanction, I argue that the prospects of sustainable reform through criminal justice interventions is likely to depend to a substantial degree upon convincing people to trust social norms rather than rely upon their private judgments of what is in their interest – that is, to become conditional cooperators.

中文翻译：

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腐败与刑法：保证与威慑

在本文中，我考虑了刑事司法干预在多大程度上有望改善系统性腐败。我区分了两种理想类型的腐败行为者——有条件的合作者和自主叛逃者——并认为通过刑事司法进行改革的前景受到每种类型相对优势的极大影响。当有条件的合作者占主导地位时，刑法主要用于确保感知到的社会规范是有效的，因为该规范既得到广泛遵守，又得到遵守，因为人们认可该规范的适当性。当自主叛逃者占主导地位时，刑法主要通过为作弊附加成本（至少在预期中）来阻止潜在的作弊者。因为基于社会规范的顺从模式往往是自我强化的，