Systemic corruption is usually described as a stable self-reinforcing equilibrium that traps individuals by reducing incentives to behave honestly. This article assumes that law enforcement institutions may also be trapped in this equilibrium, leaving no alternative to individuals who want to report corruption. Would the existence of multiple institutions performing accountability functions – what we call institutional multiplicity – reduce the probability that all institutions would be trapped in a systemic corruption environment? We start by hypothesizing that even in contexts of systemic corruption there may be ‘pockets of honesty.’ If this is the case, institutional multiplicity, by increasing the number of accountability institutions available, may create avenues for individuals to report corruption. On the other hand, multiplicity may also increase the risk of ‘façade enforcement’ – that is, the mere appearance of accountability that reinforces a systemic corruption equilibrium. We illustrate these two scenarios with Brazilian examples. We end the article with a discussion of the design of accountability systems in contexts of systemic corruption, arguing that there may be advantages in preserving institutional multiplicity if its deleterious effects are addressed. While based on the Brazilian experience, this article advances theoretical hypotheses that may be useful to other countries.

中文翻译：

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系统性腐败和制度多样性：巴西复杂关系的例子

系统性腐败通常被描述为一种稳定的自我强化均衡，它通过减少诚实行为的动机来诱捕个人。本文假设执法机构也可能陷入这种平衡，让想要举报腐败的个人别无选择。执行问责职能的多个机构的存在——我们称之为机构多样性——会降低所有机构陷入系统性腐败环境的可能性吗？我们首先假设即使在系统性腐败的情况下也可能存在“诚实的口袋”。如果是这种情况，通过增加可用问责机构的数量，机构多样性可能会为个人举报腐败创造途径。另一方面，多重性也可能增加“表面执法”的风险——即强化系统性腐败平衡的问责制的表象。我们用巴西的例子来说明这两种情况。我们以讨论系统性腐败背景下的问责制设计作为文章的结尾，认为如果解决其有害影响，维护制度多样性可能会有好处。在基于巴西经验的同时，本文提出了可能对其他国家有用的理论假设。我们以讨论系统性腐败背景下的问责制设计作为文章的结尾，认为如果解决其有害影响，维护制度多样性可能会有好处。在基于巴西经验的同时，本文提出了可能对其他国家有用的理论假设。我们以讨论系统性腐败背景下的问责制设计作为文章的结尾，认为如果解决其有害影响，维护制度多样性可能会有好处。在基于巴西经验的同时，本文提出了可能对其他国家有用的理论假设。