Since the swift passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has had the unprecedented and highly controversial authority to take ‘reasonable and proportionate’ measures to reduce threats to Canadian security. While there are some limits to the types of measures CSIS can employ, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act permits the use of measures that would otherwise contravene the laws of Canada or limit a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as they are judicially authorized by the Federal Court. As new threats proliferate around the world, it is anticipated that CSIS will increasingly carry out this mandate overseas. Yet review bodies tasked with monitoring CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures (TRMs) report that CSIS has never sought judicial authorization to conduct a TRM. Why? One answer may be that CSIS has concluded that the Charter does not govern actions carried out abroad, and, as such, their extraterritorial conduct falls beyond the reach and oversight of the Federal Court. Whether the Charter applies to CSIS’s overseas conduct ostensibly lies in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on the extraterritorial application of the Charter, R. v Hape. This article canvasses domestic and international law, as well as intelligence law theory, to explain why that presumption is wrong. Wrong, not least because the majority opinion in Hape is deeply flawed in its analysis and application of international law. But also, because intelligence operations are so distinguishable from the transnational criminal investigations at issue in Hape, the Court’s findings are inapplicable in the former context. In short, this article demonstrates that applying Hape to the actions of CSIS officers not only leaves their actions beyond the scrutiny of Canadian courts but also creates a significant human rights gap.

中文翻译：

---

“在加拿大境内或境外”：该宪章适用于加拿大安全情报局的域外活动

自 2015 年《反恐怖主义法》迅速通过以来，加拿大安全情报局 (CSIS) 拥有前所未有且极具争议的权力，可以采取“合理和相称”的措施来减少对加拿大安全的威胁。虽然 CSIS 可以采用的措施类型有一些限制，但《加拿大安全情报服务法》允许使用否则会违反加拿大法律或限制受《加拿大权利和自由宪章》保护的权利的措施，只要它们由联邦法院司法授权。随着新的威胁在世界范围内扩散，预计 CSIS 将越来越多地在海外执行这项任务。然而，负责监督 CSIS 使用减少威胁措施 (TRM) 的审查机构报告说，CSIS 从未寻求司法授权来进行 TRM。为什么？一个答案可能是 CSIS 得出的结论是，该宪章不适用于在国外开展的行动，因此，他们的域外行为超出了联邦法院的管辖范围和监督范围。宪章是否适用于 CSIS 的海外行为表面上取决于加拿大最高法院关于宪章域外适用的主要案件 R. v Hape。本文探讨了国内法和国际法以及情报法理论，以解释为什么该推定是错误的。错误，尤其是因为 Hape 的多数意见在分析和适用国际法方面存在严重缺陷。但是也，由于情报行动与 Hape 案中的跨国刑事调查如此不同，法院的调查结果不适用于前者。简而言之，本文表明，将 Hape 应用于 CSIS 官员的行为不仅会使他们的行为不受加拿大法院的审查，而且还会造成重大的人权差距。