Research on online product reviews has examined a variety of issues ranging from reviewers’ motivation to write reviews to the impact of reviews on product sales. Implicit in this research stream is the notion that more reviews are better for sellers and consumers. However, it is unclear whether both retailers, who control the review platform, and manufacturers, whose products are reviewed, prefer more reviews over fewer reviews. Using a game theoretical model of a context in which a dominant retailer sells competing products from two manufacturers to consumers who are uncertain about product quality and fit, we show that the retailers’ and manufacturers’ preferences regarding the number of reviews are not always aligned. The nature of misalignment depends on whether the quality or the fit is more dominant in terms of consumers’ evaluation of products. If generating reviews do not cost anything, we found that additional reviews always benefit the retailer; however, if the number of reviews exceeds a threshold in the quality-dominates-fit case scenario, they may be harmful to the manufacturer. On the other hand, if the retailer incurs a sufficiently high cost to generate reviews, the retailer may prefer to have fewer reviews. We show that retailers can exploit the divide between retailers’ and manufacturers’ preferences for reviews and monetize reviews by charging a fee to the manufacturers in return for a guarantee on the number of reviews that they generate. We show that the product type and review platform design play a significant role in the attractiveness of review monetization for retailers. Even if reviews are monetized, we determined that retailers’ revenue from “selling” reviews to manufacturers does not exceed the cost of generating reviews, implying that the benefit from reviews is driven the positive impacts of reviews on the retailer’s core business of selling products to consumers. However, in the fit-dominates-quality case scenario, retailers do not prefer large numbers of reviews whereas manufacturers do. In this case, we found that retailers are unable to exploit the misalignment between retailers’ and manufacturers’ preferences for reviews through review monetization.

中文翻译：

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越多越好吗？零售商和制造商对评论和评论货币化的偏好之间的分歧

对在线产品评论的研究已经研究了从评论者撰写评论的动机到评论对产品销售的影响等各种问题。该研究流中隐含的概念是，更多评论对卖家和消费者更好。然而，目前尚不清楚控制评论平台的零售商和产品接受评论的制造商是否更喜欢更多评论而不是更少评论。使用博弈论模型的背景下，占主导地位的零售商将来自两个制造商的竞争产品销售给不确定产品质量和适合度的消费者，我们表明零售商和制造商对评论数量的偏好并不总是一致的。错位的性质取决于消费者对产品的评价是质量还是合身更占优势。如果生成评论不需要任何成本，我们发现额外的评论总是有利于零售商；但是，如果评论数量超过质量主导适合案例场景中的阈值，则它们可能对制造商有害。另一方面，如果零售商产生足够高的成本来生成评论，则零售商可能更愿意拥有更少的评论。我们表明，零售商可以利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的差异，通过向制造商收取费用以换取对他们产生的评论数量的保证，从而将评论货币化。我们表明，产品类型和评论平台设计在评论货币化对零售商的吸引力中起着重要作用。即使评论被货币化，我们确定零售商从“销售”评论给制造商的收入不超过产生评论的成本，这意味着评论的好处是推动了评论对零售商销售产品的核心业务的积极影响消费者。然而，在适合-主导-质量的情况下，零售商不喜欢大量评论，而制造商则喜欢。在这种情况下，我们发现零售商无法通过评论货币化来利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的不一致。我们确定零售商从“销售”评论给制造商的收入不超过产生评论的成本，这意味着评论的好处是推动了评论对零售商向消费者销售产品的核心业务的积极影响。然而，在适合-主导-质量的情况下，零售商不喜欢大量评论，而制造商则喜欢。在这种情况下，我们发现零售商无法通过评论货币化来利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的不一致。我们确定零售商从“销售”评论给制造商的收入不超过产生评论的成本，这意味着评论的好处是推动了评论对零售商向消费者销售产品的核心业务的积极影响。然而，在适合-主导-质量的情况下，零售商不喜欢大量评论，而制造商则喜欢。在这种情况下，我们发现零售商无法通过评论货币化来利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的不一致。零售商不喜欢大量评论，而制造商则喜欢。在这种情况下，我们发现零售商无法通过评论货币化来利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的不一致。零售商不喜欢大量评论，而制造商则喜欢。在这种情况下，我们发现零售商无法通过评论货币化来利用零售商和制造商对评论的偏好之间的不一致。