This letter studies the task offloading in reputation-based consortium blockchain networks, where the tasks are transmitted to Edge Computing Servers (ECSs) due to limited resources. We propose a novel Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) consensus mechanism in which validation nodes (including active nodes and backup nodes) are voted based on their reputation. The incentive identifies the reputation and the consensus delay as two major factors determining the reward. A three-stage Stackelberg game is developed to jointly minimize cost of the users and maximize utilities of the master node and the validation nodes. We analyze the unique Stackelberg equilibrium exists in the proposed game by the backward induction. The simulation results demonstrate that the designed incentive is feasible for trust management, and the proposed consensus has lower delay and higher decentralization compared with the traditional DPoS.

中文翻译：

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基于信誉的联盟区块链网络中的任务卸载游戏

这封信研究了基于信誉的联盟区块链网络中的任务卸载，由于资源有限，任务被传输到边缘计算服务器（ECS）。我们提出了一种新颖的委托权益证明 (DPoS) 共识机制，其中验证节点（包括活动节点和备份节点）根据其声誉进行投票。激励将声誉和共识延迟确定为决定奖励的两个主要因素。开发了一个三阶段的 Stackelberg 博弈，以共同最小化用户成本并最大化主节点和验证节点的效用。我们通过反向归纳分析了所提出的博弈中存在的唯一 Stackelberg 均衡。仿真结果表明，所设计的激励对于信任管理是可行的，